From and psychology to an empirically-informed philosophy of logic
Amsterdam, December 7-8 2010
Confirmed speakers and tentative titles:
(logic – University of Amsterdam ): Opening
David Over (psychology – Durham ): “New paradigm psychology of conditionals”
Michiel van Lambalgen (logic and philosophy – University of Amsterdam ): “Logical form in cognitive processes”
Helen de Cruz (philosophy – Leuven University ): "Animal logic, an evolutionary perspective on "
Rafael Nuñez (cognitive science – UC San Diego): “Towards a cognitive science of proof”
Francis Jeffrey Pelletier (cognitive science, philosophy, linguistics – Simon Fraser University ): "Reasoning with generic information"
Catarina Dutilh Novaes (philosophy –
The workshop will bring together logicians, philosophers, psychologists and cognitive scientists to discuss the interface between cognitive science and psychology, on the one hand, and the philosophy of logic on the other hand. More specifically, we wish to investigate the extent to which (if at all), and in what ways, experimental results from these fields may contribute to the formulation of an empirically-informed philosophy of logic, taking into account how human agents, logicians and non-logicians alike, in fact reason.
We invite submissions of two-page abstracts (roughly 1000 words) from young researchers and graduate students as well as senior researchers, working in philosophy, psychology, cognitive science and logic. We aim at having a multi-disciplinary line-up of contributed papers. PDF is the preferred format.
We are specifically interested in papers raising questions within (traditional) philosophy of logic which may benefit from an empirically-informed approach; at this point, it seems crucial that the right questions be raised.
We also welcome general, methodological papers on the very idea of, and prospects for, an empirically-based philosophy of logic - e.g. how can empirical data have any bearing at all on a (arguably) normative (as opposed to descriptive) enterprise such as logic?
Papers on how already available empirical results on (human) cognition can shed new light on traditional problems within the philosophy of logic -- e.g. the meaning of the ; naturalism, psychologism and realism in philosophy of logic; evolutionary accounts of logic and logical cognition; among many others -- are particularly welcome.
See the workshop’s website for further suggestions of relevant topics.
Notification of acceptance:
Send your abstract to peipl2010 @ gmail.com (remove spaces).
Scientific committee: Catarina Dutilh Novaes, and Michiel van Lambalgen