Friday, May 28, 2010

Workshop: CogSci to Empirically-informed Philosophy of Logic


From cognitive science and psychology to an empirically-informed philosophy of logic

Amsterdam, December 7-8 2010

Confirmed speakers and tentative titles:

Johan van Benthem (logic University of Amsterdam ): Opening

David Over (psychology – Durham ): “New paradigm psychology of conditionals”

Michiel van Lambalgen (logic and philosophy University of Amsterdam ): “Logical form in cognitive processes”

Helen de Cruz (philosophy – Leuven University ): "Animal logic, an evolutionary perspective on deductive reasoning"

Rafael Nuñez (cognitive science – UC San Diego): “Towards a cognitive science of proof”

Francis Jeffrey Pelletier (cognitive science, philosophy, linguistics – Simon Fraser University ): "Reasoning with generic information"

Catarina Dutilh Novaes (philosophy University of Amsterdam ): “Formal languages and the extended mind”

The workshop will bring together logicians, philosophers, psychologists and cognitive scientists to discuss the interface between cognitive science and psychology, on the one hand, and the philosophy of logic on the other hand. More specifically, we wish to investigate the extent to which (if at all), and in what ways, experimental results from these fields may contribute to the formulation of an empirically-informed philosophy of logic, taking into account how human agents, logicians and non-logicians alike, in fact reason.

We invite submissions of two-page abstracts (roughly 1000 words) from young researchers and graduate students as well as senior researchers, working in philosophy, psychology, cognitive science and logic. We aim at having a multi-disciplinary line-up of contributed papers. PDF is the preferred format.

We are specifically interested in papers raising questions within (traditional) philosophy of logic which may benefit from an empirically-informed approach; at this point, it seems crucial that the right questions be raised.

We also welcome general, methodological papers on the very idea of, and prospects for, an empirically-based philosophy of logic - e.g. how can empirical data have any bearing at all on a (arguably) normative (as opposed to descriptive) enterprise such as logic?

Papers on how already available empirical results on (human) cognition can shed new light on traditional problems within the philosophy of logic -- e.g. the meaning of the logical constants; naturalism, psychologism and realism in philosophy of logic; evolutionary accounts of logic and logical cognition; among many others -- are particularly welcome.

See the workshop’s website for further suggestions of relevant topics.

Submission deadline: June 20th 2010

Notification of acceptance: July 23rd 2010

Send your abstract to peipl2010 @ (remove spaces).

Scientific committee: Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Martin Stokhof and Michiel van Lambalgen


No comments: