Special Issue on The Role of Intuitions in Philosophical Methodology
In recent years the role that intuitions play in contemporary analytic philosophy has been a topic of heated debate. While some believe that our intuitions give us a priori knowledge about matters of linguistic meaning, or even about matters of metaphysics, others believe that our intuitions should not be regarded as more trustworthy in philosophy than they are in other areas, like the sciences, where we do not actually place too much trust in them (for good reasons) and look for other sources of knowledge instead. This special issue of Studia Philosophica Estonica welcomes contributions on any of the following questions:
- What exactly are "intuitions"? Are they different from beliefs? Can they change, if we decide to "give them up"? Is it possible to "train" them? Are there "persistent" philosophical intuitions immune to such reform?
- What is the evidential status of these intuitions? Can intuitions be true or false, reliable or unreliable? If they are evidence at all, what are they evidence for?
- What is the significance of conflicts between opposing intuitions? How is such conflict to be adjudicated?
- What is the relevance of recent results in "Experimental Philosophy" for this methodology? Is it of any relevance for the role of intuitions in philosophy that non-philosophers might have different intuitions than philosophers?
- How did the role that intuitions play in contemporary analytic philosophy develop throughout the history of the profession? How did the justification of this methodology develop?
This special issue is edited by Sören Häggqvist (Stockholm University) and Daniel Cohnitz (University of Tartu).
Deadline for submissions: April 1, 2009
Publication: October 1, 2009
Papers should be received through our online submission system (http://www.spe.ut.ee) no later than April 1st, 2009.
Submissions must be in English and conform to the submission standards of the journal and the methodological standards of analytic philosophy.